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A B S T R A C T
By combining an economic two-sector general equilibrium model with a material flow model we study the
coupled human-resource-environment feedbacks associated with phosphorus use and recycling, and the eco-
nomic and environmental effects of implementing phosphorus recovering technologies from waste water. Using
recycled phosphorus as fertilizer increases environmental quality and profits in the agricultural sector.
Furthermore, the economy does not depend as much on mineral fertilizer imports and is therefore more resilient
to a price increase on the global phosphorus market. However, there is a need to improve the quantity and
quality of recycled phosphorus products. Overall, reduction of phosphorus in soil and water bodies as result of
economic decisions is only possible if phosphorus is recovered from waste water and the prices of imported
mineral fertilizer rise. Policy makers can support this technological change by subsidizing recycled phosphorus
or introducing taxes or tolls for imported mineral fertilizer to increase its price. Alternatively, societal values
would have to change. Such a change may be induced by putting a higher preference on a healthy environment
and hence being willing to pay more for food and consequently production inputs like phosphorus fertilizer
recycled from sewage sludge.
1. Introduction
Phosphorus (P) is an essential element for plant and animal growth
and is necessary to maintain profitable crop and livestock production
(Sharpley and Beegle, 2001). Food production depends on nonrenew-
able mineral phosphorus supplies from a finite P stock (Childers et al.,
2011; Dawson and Hilton, 2011). There is a general consensus that the
quality and accessibility of remaining reserves are decreasing and costs
will increase in the medium and long term, additional to possible price
shocks of phosphate fertilizer like in 2008 (Cordell and White, 2011).
Efficient fertilizer use not only increases profits Venezian (1962),
also sustainable P use is crucial to preserve food security and this affects
households' consumption decisions and consequently the whole
economy.
Furthermore, P fertilizer use can negatively influence the environ-
ment. Mineral P fertilizer contains heavy metals (Zoboli et al., 2016a)
and P is the critical element for eutrophication in most fresh waters
besides nitrogen (N). Overfertilization leads to increased P stocks in soil
and consequently emissions to surrounding water bodies increase.
Generally, anthropogenic activities are the main causes of pollution and
environmental problems (Ghazi et al., 2014). Pesticide and fertilizer
consumption may reach problematic levels (Saysel et al., 2002) and
rural living, livestock, paddy field, and precipitation alternately become
the leading source of non-point source (NPS) pollution (Carpenter et al.,
1998; Yuan et al., 2017).
Even though measures to ensure P availability are under discussion
and the European Commission included phosphate rock into the revised
list of Critical Raw Materials (EU-Commission et al., 2014) in 2014,
only two countries have introduced new legislation enforcing P re-
cycling from wastewater, namely Switzerland (Der Schweizerische,
2015) and Germany (VVEA, 2017). Moreover, economic incentives like
subsidies for P recycling or increased prices for mineral fertilizer, their
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consequences and environmental feedbacks still need to be in-
vestigated.
Various approaches shed light on different aspects of this complex
topic.
Egle et al. (2015) describes technologies for recovering phosphorus
from municipal wastewater and Egle et al. (2016) compares them under
technological, environmental and economic assessment. Amann et al.
(2018) then presents the overall environmental impact assessment of 17
phosphorus recovery technologies considering P recovery potential,
heavy metal and organic micropollutant decontamination potential and
fertilizer efficiency. Although these studies provide an extensive in-
formative basis, from an economic perspective they are limited to the
quantification of the implementation costs and do not account for po-
tential feedbacks in the economy.
Other branches of science model emissions of P into water bodies
and address the issue of eutrophication in watersheds. Non-point source
pollution from agricultural soils and water quality can be described and
assessed with a large variety of models, ranging from physically based
to empirical approaches, from spatially lumped to distributed and from
deterministic to stochastic (Tsakiris and Alexakis, 2012). In this con-
text, Sharpley et al. (2015) identified the poor knowledge and under-
standing of the economic dimension as one of the main research gaps
regarding the reduction of agricultural emissions of P into water bodies.
Material Flow Analysis (MFA) constitutes the ideal technique to
capture the manifold issues around P management, i.e. P availability, P
recycling and P emissions, and to investigate them simultaneously with
a system perspective. Over the past decade, a very large number of
MFAs for P were performed at city, region, country and international
level (see review of Chowdhury et al., 2014). By describing and bal-
ancing flows and stocks of P across all major anthropogenic and natural
compartments, such studies enabled the identification and quantifica-
tion of problems and lacks of efficiencies in societal P use, but also
pointed out where the largest potentials for improvements lie. In Aus-
tria, which is used as case-study for the present work, this was done by
Egle et al. (2014) and Zoboli et al. (2016a). Based on the knowledge
gained through MFA, different attempts were made to understand how
regional and national P management could be optimized (Vadenbo
et al., 2014; Hanserud et al., 2016; Zoboli et al., 2016b; Kliglmair et al.,
2017). Although all these works are based on solid system under-
standing provided by the detailed mass balances, none of them includes
in its scope the economic dimension of the proposed measures.
Economically extended material flow analysis (EE-MFA) is an at-
tempt to study causal relationships between economically motivated
human behavior and resource consumption (Kytzia et al., 2004).
However, the simplified linear relations of EE-MFA serve not as an
appropriate tool for an in-depth analysis of the economic system.
Bouman et al. (2000) compares economic models which incorporate
material flows: mathematical methods, data requirements and de-
marcation of the problem are different for stochastic frontier analysis
(SFA), life cycle assessment (LCA), input-output analysis (IOA) and
partial equilibrium models. Additionally, goals and assumptions de-
fining the role of materials, the rigidity of economic relations and
physical constraints, and economy-environment interactions can differ.
E.g. LCA of fertilizers (Skowrońska and Filipek, 2014) may include the
environmental impact of systems recycling plant nutrients (Spångberg,
2014) or impacts of fertilizer production (Amann et al., 2018).
Economic models, i.e. partial equilibrium models, analyze fertilizer
demand via a cost (Boyle, 1982) or via a profit function (Larson and
Vroomen, 1991; Liverpool-Tasie, 2017). Subsequently, (computable)
general equilibrium models capture firm and consumer behavior to
analyze fertilizer use or agricultural pollution (Diamond, 1967; Joy,
1973; Liu et al., 1996; Hassan and Hallam, 1996; Beghin et al., 1997;
Calzadilla et al., 2010, e.g.) in the context of growth, trade or the en-
vironment. So far (partial) equilibrium models have looked at fertilizer
decisions and their environmental impacts (Boyle, 1982; Larson and
Vroomen, 1991; Liverpool-Tasie, 2017), but none of these models has
integrated material flows. Bouman et al. (2000) applied MFA and a
partial equilibrium model to the same environmental problem to
compare the methods and advocates to integrate them.
Other economic studies have used cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to
assess the trade-offs between the benefits derived from polluting ac-
tivity and the environmental losses that derive from pollution Dixon
et al. (1994); United Nations Environment (2016); Cazcarro et al.
(2016). E.g. Gren et al. (2008); Wustenberghs et al. (2008); Bryhn
(2009) and Hautakangas et al. (2014) study P management around the
Baltic sea. Lancelot et al. (2011) applied integrated impact assessment
methodology to the same issue. Moreover, simulation models explore
and illustrate dynamics of socio-ecological systems and can simulate
farm decision-making in agricultural systems (e.g. Schreinemachers and
Berger, 2011). Yang et al. (2011) provides a very general model for
recycling materials. Carpenter et al. (1999) modeled a lake subject to
phosphorus pollution and Saysel et al. (2002) is the only Agent-Based
Modeling and Simulation (ABMS) and System Dynamics Modeling and
Simulation (SDMS) literature published between 2000 and 2015
(Moon, 2017) that also includes agricultural pollution. It yields that its
two key environmental factors, pesticide and fertilizer consumption,
may reach problematic levels.
None of the mentioned models includes two-way coupled feedbacks
between economic activities and environment.
Cools et al. (2011) applies an alternative model approach by cou-
pling a hydrological water quality model and an economic optimization
model. They set up a scenario for nitrogen to obtain a cost-effective
emission reduction. It includes wastewater treatment plant (WWTP)
efficiency, fodder efficiency and fertilizer tuning, but is only build on a
linear costs' assumption.
More complex multi-market equilibrium analysis on European
agriculture like Moschini et al. (2005) does not consider fertilizer use.
Also System Dynamics Modeling and Simulation (SDMS) literature
published between 2000 and 2015 (Moon, 2017) is lacking investiga-
tion on P fertilizer use.
It is important to analyze coupled human-environmental feedbacks,
i.e. to understand households' consumption decisions and their en-
vironmental impact as well as farmers fertilizer decisions. To do so, we
combine material flow analysis (MFA) methodology and terminology
(Baccini and Brunner, 1991, 2012; Brunner and Rechberger, 2004) with
an economic model framework. This gives additional value to each
model type: on the one hand, we include farmers' and households' de-
cisions and resulting optimized profits and utility in a resource man-
agement framework. To our knowledge it is the first attempt to en-
dogenously describe material flows based on economic decisions. On
the other hand, we introduce the P cycle into a two-sector general
equilibrium model. This integration allows to analyze welfare change
and income distribution effects of change in physical system.
The model is calibrated to fit an Austrian P time series described in
Zoboli et al. (2016a) and respective economic data from Wien-Statistik
(2010). The parameter choice is location specific, but relevant to many
watersheds, regions or countries with a similar soil structure and
economy.
The dynamic economic general equilibrium model is solved analy-
tically and numerically (using Matlab©) to point out the most im-
portant mechanisms that influence the decision makers.
The aim of the presented work is to establish a conceptual model
with an economy-wide perspective on sustainable P use and understand
coupled human-resource-environment feedbacks embedded in an eco-
nomic framework. Based on that understanding we can investigate
implications of introducing P recovery technologies (see e.g. Egle et al.,
2014), of price changes in mineral P fertilizer (see e.g. Kytzia et al.,
2004; Zoboli et al., 2016b), or of different societal preferences for a
healthy environment (see e.g. Ambec and Coria, 2013). This contributes
to better understand the socio-economic metabolism (Ayres, 1989;
Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl, 1998) and adds to the fields of bio-eco-
nomic models (Dellink et al., 2011; Flichman and Allen, 2015), coupled
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hydro-economic models (Bekchanov et al., 2017) and socio-hydrology
(Pande and Sivapalan, 2017).
The basic model is introduced in the first section. In the results
section we first present analytical solutions before we continue with
numerical results. Within our framework we discuss different scenarios:
First, a price shock of imported fertilizer similar to 2008. Second, the
use of different recycling technologies to understand economic and
environmental impacts. And third, an environmental friendly society with
relatively higher individual preferences for a healthy environment
compared to consumption to point out societal impact. A sensitivity
analysis captures uncertainty. The last sections conclude and we discuss
model limitations and future directions. Derivations, proofs, and the
numerical Matlab©-algorithm are found in the Appendixes.
2. Conceptual model
We develop an analytical general equilibrium model for a two sector
economy. The model introduced in this paper is based on a reduced
form of the phosphorus (P) cycle (Egle et al., 2014) and adds an eco-
nomic dimension to explain the demand for phosphorus by various
stakeholders. The aim of the model is to capture the mechanisms and
interlinks between major stakeholders and decision makers (as re-
presented by households and various economic sectors). An overview of
the model including the inflows and outflows between the different
sectors of the economy and households is given in Fig. 1. Between crop
production and animal husbandry are monetary and non-monetary
inter-industry linkages. Households supply labor and demand food. We
add P flows as a second layer to the economic model and introduce a
waste water treatment plant to recover P. Crop farmers can choose a
combination of recycled P fertilizer and imported mineral fertilizer to
produce high-quality grain and fodder. Farmers in animal husbandry
decide on the amount of fodder. The model agents, i.e. households,
farmers and the WWTP, and their interactions are described in details in
the following subsections.
2.1. Economic model
We model a closed economy representing one million inhabitants L
living in urban and rural areas. Only a small proportion of the popu-
lation works in the agricultural sector, everyone else works in other
sectors (Lx). Farmers can choose to work in crop production (Lg) or
animal husbandry (La).
2.1.1. Households
We assume that all agents are employed
( = + +L t L t L t L t( ) ( ) ( ) ( )g a x ) and that the labor supply for agriculture
is constant. Within the agricultural sector we allow workers to decide to
either work for crop production or animal husbandry.+ = =L t L t L L const( ) ( ) .g a x (1)
Households demand vegetarian products c t( )gc (represented by grain)
and meat products c t( )ac and derive utility from environmental quality+E t( 1) in the next period. The environmental quality reflects the
water quality with respect to eutrophication as well as the accumula-
tion of heavy metals and organic micropollutants in soils. Household's
consumption choice impacts environmental quality indirectly.
Consequently feedbacks between households consumption decisions
and environmental quality occur.
Households maximize their utility function u t( ) in every period.
Other goods x t( ) than grain c t( )gc and animal products c t( )ac are assumed
constant and therefore not subject to optimal choice. We choose the
form of a log-utility function that yields the optimal consumption de-
cision as a constant budget share. c, c and are positive constants
reflecting the importance of the respective consumption goods.
+ = + + +u c t c t E t c t c t E tmax ( ( ), ( ), ( 1)) max log( ( )) log( ( )) log( ( 1))
cgc t cac t
g
c
a
c
cgc t cac t
c g
c c a
c
{ ( ), ( )} { ( ), ( )}
(2)
Household's consumption cannot exceed the income earned, described
in Eq. (3), where p t( )gc , p t( )ac , p t( )x are the prices for grain products, the
animal products, and composite other goods, respectively. Households
supply labor to the firms in exchange for a wage w t( ), and receive
profits from grain production t( )g , animal husbandry t( )a , fertilizer
trader t( )G , waste water treatment plant t( )w and other sectors t( )x .
Moreover the value of fertilizer imports p t P t( ( ) ( ))m m is assigned to the
households. So the household's budget constraint (Eq. (3)) is aligned
with the national budget constraint.
Fig. 1. Outline of the model framework. We
denote with the letter g the grain field, a the
animal husbandry, h the households, w the
waste water treatment plant (WWTP), m the
mineral fertilizer from industry and x the other
sectors. The subscripts of the consumption c,
prices p and phosphorus P variables describe
the source of the flow and the superscript de-
scribes the destination.
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+ + + + ++ + +p t c t p t c t p x w t L t t t tt p t P t( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )g
c
g
c
a
c
a
c
x g a G
w x m m (3)
2.1.2. Crop production
We assume that phosphorus (P) fertilizer denoted by G and labor
inputs Lg are chosen to maximize profits of the crop production cg. All
other production inputs like agricultural land, seeds, alternative ferti-
lizer and irrigation are assumed constant and summarized within the
crop production technology g. The production elasticities g and g
describe the importance of the production inputs P fertilizer and labor,
respectively. In addition to labor L t( )g and P fertilizer G t( ), the pro-
duction of grain also depends on P in manure P t( 1)a and P in the soil
(P t( 1)n ). The production function of grain c t( )g is therefore given as
follows:= + +c t P t P t G t L t( ) (( ( ( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( )) ( ( )) ,g g a a n n L gg g
(4)
with a and n denoting the respective efficiency of P in manure and in
the soil, is the P loss via runoff from the field and L denotes the labor
efficiency. After every period farmers adapt the fixed proportion gc of
their yield that is supplied to the households as high-quality products=c c t( )gc gc g and the share = 1ga gc that is supplied as fodder=c c t( )ga ga g to the animal husbandry sector. The different quality of the
products implies different prices on the market. Grain farmers max-
imize the profit function
=G t L t p t c G t L t p t G t w t L tmax ( ( ), ( )) max ( ) ( ( ), ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
G t Lg t
g g
G t Lg t
g g g G g
{ ( ), ( )} { ( ), ( )} (5)
with the composite price = +p t p t p t( ) ( ) ( )g gc gc ga ga .
2.1.3. Animal husbandry
To generate meat products, we assume fodder and labor as the
variable production inputs. Other production factors like land are
assumed constant with the total factor productivity a. The production
elasticities a and a reflect the impact of the production inputs fodder
and labor on animal husbandry, respectively. Farmers in animal hus-
bandry demand labor L t( )a and fodder c t( )ga to produce animal products
c t( )ac with the following production technology:=c t c t L t( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))ac a ga L aa a (6)
The relation of fodder to final meat products is given by the inverse feed
conversion ratio (FCR) and labor efficiency L scales the work force.
Farmers maximize the profit function
=c t L t p t c c t L t p t c t w t L tmax ( ( ), ( )) max ( ) ( ( ), ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
cga t La t
a g
a a
cga t La t
a a
c
g
a a g g
a a
{ ( ), ( )} { ( ), ( )} (7)
2.1.4. Market equilibrium
Every period farms in crop production and animal husbandry decide
on the production inputs to maximize their profit t( )g and t( )a , re-
spectively, and households maximize their utility function u t( ) by
choosing the consumption goods. The optimal decisions of the agents
result in supply and demand functions for every market. The detailed
derivation of the market equilibria for vegetarian products c t( )gc , grain
fodder c t( )ga , animal products c t( )ac , labor L t( ) and P fertilizer G t( ), is
given in Appendix A. The corresponding prices that result in equili-
brium are p t( )G , p t( )gc , p t( )ga , p t( )a , and w t( ).
2.2. P dynamics
In addition to the economic model framework we construct a mass
balance model to capture the P cycle based on Zoboli et al. (2016a).
Again, we use Fig. 1 to outline the model dynamics, but focus on the
corresponding P flows replicated in Fig. 2.
P can be recovered from the household's sewage sludge P t( 1)h
and is sold as recycled fertilizer product P t( )w or goes to landfill P t( )wd .
Additional to the P in the soil P t( )n grain farmers apply manure P t( )ag ,
Fig. 2. Schematic illustration of the phosphorus flow model of the 2-sector economy (Fig. 1) generated with the MFA software STAN (http://www.stan2web.net/).
Processes (=balance volumes) with or without stocks are represented as boxes, and flows are shown as arrows including variable names.
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mineral fertilizer P t( )m and recycled fertilizer P t( )w to the field, where
mineral and recycled fertilizer are supplied as a composite fertilizer
product G by a trader. While plants are growing (Fig. 3) a part goes as
runoff = + + +P t P t P t P t P t( ) [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]g w m ag n to the receiving water
bodies.
Plant harvest contains P t( )g tons of P. The rest remains in the soil as+P t( 1)n for the next period t+1.+ =P t P t P t P t( 1) ( ) ( ) ( )n n g g (8)
Plant harvest is processed into a share c t
c t
( )
( )
g
c
g
of qualitative vegetarian
food for households containing P t( )gc tons of P and a share c tc t
( )
( )
g
a
g
of fodder
for animal husbandry containing P t( )ga tons of P, whereas a fraction g
ends up as food waste ( =P Pg g gw).+ =P t P t P t( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )gc ga g g (9)
A share ag of P t( )ga in the fodder returns as manure +P t( 1)ag to the field
and the remaining share = 1ac ag is processed into animal products
c t( )ac containing P t( )ac tons of P. Again, during processing a fraction a
ends up as food waste ( =P Pa ga aw).+ =P t P t P t( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )ag ac a ga (10)
The P in sewage sludge is a fraction of P in the household's consumption
goods = +P t P t P t( ) ( ) ( )h hg gc ha ac . The rest goes into solid wastes, whichare not considered further.
2.2.1. P recovery technology from wastewater
The P recovery technology A recovers P from sewage sludge of the
households P t( )h to offer the recycled product +P t( 1)w in the next
period to the trader. We choose four different P recovery technologies
to represent the various possible recovery routes mentioned in Egle
(2014): direct application of sewage sludge without treatment (A1),
phosphorus recovery from sludge liquor, i.e. Ostara Pearl Reactor® (A2),
from sewage sludge, i.e. Stuttgart process (A3) and from sewage sludge
ash, i.e. EcoPhos® (A4).
These technologies A are characterized by the following four cri-
teria: Firstly, the fertilizer efficiency A( ) [0, 1]w determines the
plant availability of the fertilizer product, i.e the percentage of applied
P that the plant can actually absorb considering timing of P application
and chemical structure. Secondly, the accumulation of heavy metals
and micropollutants negatively influences the environment with a price
p A( )w
f for one ton of applied fertilizer product. Thirdly, the recovery
potential of phosphorus treated with technology A is A( ) [0, 1].
Fourthly, the price p A( )w to sell one ton of recycled fertilizer product is
an estimate based on the annualized investment costs I A( ) to build
technology A, the operating costs V A( ) using the technology A and the
logistic costs to bring the recycled product to the fields. A technology
operates roughly 15 years without large additional investments. Waste
water treatment plants (WWTP) with design capacities= 100,000 PE
treat more than 55% of municipal wastewater in Austria Egle et al.
(2014). Therefore investment costs are calculated for ten representative
100.000-population-equivalent (PE) plants to serve one Mio. in-
habitants. We summarize the technologies and their characteristics in
Table E.5.
Before P recovery, a proportion from the waste water is going as
effluent P t( )w to the water bodies and after applying technology A a
certain part +P t( 1)wd has to go to landfill (Fig. 1 and 2). The rest can be
the maximum supply of +P t( 1)w on the P market. Everything that
cannot be sold as +P t( 1)w and is not discharged into water bodies as
P t( )w is landfilled. We summarize the relations in the following equa-
tions.=P t P t( ) ( )w h (11)
==P t A P t P tA A P t( ) ( )( ( 1) ( 1))( )(1 ( )) ( 1)wmaxsupply h wh (12)
=P t P t P t P t( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1)wd h w w (13)
The profit of the WWTP for selling P t( )w to the trader is=t p A P t( ) ( ) ( ).w w w (14)
2.2.2. P in plants
Different P products are applied to the crop fields. The ability of a
plant to absorb P depends on the type of fertilizer (composition, che-
mical species, etc.), the time of application, and the soil conditions at
the site. We define these properties as efficiency i, i a n m w{ , , , } of
the product type i. With respect to soil type, we assume a generic
average representing major soil type in Austria (acid or alkaline). P in
the soil (P t( )n ) is always available but generally difficult to absorb for
the plant ( n). Manure P t( )a from animal husbandry is not always ap-
plied when the plants are ready to take it and so its efficiency a is
affected. Contrary, the timing of application of mineral fertilizer P t( )m
can be well chosen by the farmers and furthermore, the chemical
structure allows for high take up rates of the plant ( m). The efficiency
w of the recycled P product P t( )w depends on the recycling technology
A. The ideal plant demand for P is P¯ , whereas the actual for the plant
available P might differ (Eq. (15)).= + ++P t P t P t P tP t( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1)( ) ( 1).w w m m a an n (15)
2.2.3. Trader
The trader supplies the crop farmers with fertilizer G t( ) and pro-
duces fertilizer by combining recycled phosphorus P t( )w and imported
mineral fertilizer P t( )m . He aims to meet the fertilizer quantity G t( ) (Eq.
(16)) demanded by the grain farmers considering fertilizer products'
efficiency and runoff after application of the fertilizer G t( ).= +G t P t P t( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )w w m m (16)
The trader also aims to meet the plant's maximum fertilizer demand G¯
Fig. 3. Phosphorus dynamics within one period.
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according to P¯ , hence, avoiding overfertilization by fulfilling the
quantity constraint = +G P t P t¯ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )w w m m in Fig. 4. How-
ever, the trader is only a functional intermediary and cannot earn
profits. Therefore he is obliged to fulfill his budget constraint (Eq. (17))
in Fig. 4. = +p t G t p t P t p A P t( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )G m m w w (17)
The trader cannot sell more recycled P products P t( )w than the WWTP is
supplying (P t( )w maxsupply in Fig. 4).
To sum up, the trader aims for an appropriate fertilizer quantity and
is restricted to the zero-profit-condition. This yields the amount of P t( )m
and P t( )w used for agricultural production. If the plants quantity de-
mand G t¯ ( ) cannot be met with the farmers willingness to pay for fer-
tilizer p t( )G the trader sells = +G t G t t( ) ¯ ( ) ( ) and the budget con-
straint reads + = +p t G t p t P t p A P t( )[ ¯ ( ) ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )G m m w w . All cases for
under- and overfertilization ( t( ) 0) are explained in Appendix B.
2.2.4. Environmental quality
Environmental quality in the model is a stylized variable that takes
into account the potential damages caused by P in water bodies and the
accumulation of contaminants on soils deriving by the application of
fertilizers. We conceived it as a positive index between zero (environ-
mental disaster, i.e. algae bloom) and a maximum E¯ (well balanced
ecosystem). It decreases by P emissions from agricultural fields P t( )g
and from waste water treatment effluents P t( )w , and by accumulation of
heavy metals and organic micropollutants via fertilizers P t( )w or P t( )m in
the fields. Environment can also regenerate with a rate > 1. This re-
sults in the following dynamics for environmental quality, following
standard environmental economic models explained in e.g. Caravaggio
and Sodini (2018) and empirical work of Zoboli et al. (2016b).
+ =E t E t P t P t p A P t p P t( 1) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )g w wf w mf m (18)
3. Results
The model can be solved explicitly for all variables, which allows
extensive analysis of interrelationships. Thus, we first present main
analytical results based on the market equilibria derived in Appendix A.
Then, we continue with numerical results of the model based on a time
frame of 15 years reflecting the operating time of a P recovering
technology. The parameter values are calibrated according to Austrian
data (Wien-Statistik, 2010; Zoboli et al., 2016a) and listed in Table E.3.
An overview of all variables and parameters included in the model is
given in Appendix E. For each numerical simulation we assume that the
available recycling technology is fixed and solve for general equili-
brium prices and quantities in each period.
Furthermore, the numerical results of three different scenarios are
discussed. (1) The mineral fertilizer price pm increases in period =t 7
from 2.040 EUR/t to 3.500 EUR/t, similar to the price increase in 2008.
(2) The economic and environmental impact of different recycling
technologies characterized in Table E.5 is compared. (3) The household
preference for a healthy environment in Eq. (2) is increased from 0.1 to
3 and 5 to reflect an environmental friendly society. Finally, a sensitivity
analysis for crucial model parameters points out their impact on the
results.
3.1. Analytical results
Since a central aim of the paper is to understand the phosphorus
cycle and its relation to the specific fertilizers applied, we first consider
Fig. 4. The constraints for the traders Pm and Pw supply.
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analytical results on the market for fertilizers. A further important
consideration of our model is to understand the environmental di-
mension of phosphorus use, considering households demand environ-
mental quality. We therefore present main analytical feedback me-
chanisms between household demand of grain and animal products and
the environment.
3.1.1. Market for fertilizer
The market mechanisms determine the specific quantity of the
composite fertilizer G used by the farmers. Farmer's profit maximization
(Eq. (5)) yields their fertilizer demand curve (Eq. (A.13)) displayed in
Figs. 6–8. Their willingness to pay the price pGWTP for fertilizer G results
from meeting the optimal plant supply =G G¯ (curve plant maxG in
Figs. 6–8) at market equilibrium point WTPfarmer . Note, that the fer-
tilizer traders, and consequently the grain farmers, face price and
quantity constraints as illustrated in Fig. 5–8, and explained in Fig. 5
and the following Corollar.
Corollar 1. The price p t( )G of the composite fertilizer good G t( ) is
constrained by the effective price levels p t( )m
m
(in case only mineral
fertilizer is used) and p t( )w
w
(in case only recycled P is applied). Any
combination of mineral and recycled fertilizers results in a price combination
of these two prices and cannot exceed its interval.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.□
In consequence of the Corollar, farmers will over- or underfertilize if
their demand for the composite fertilizer good G t( ) is above or below
both effective price levels, respectively. If for example the demand of
farmers is above the more expensive fertilizer price (Fig. 7–8), farmers
spend all their available budget p G¯GWTP (curve pGcosts) on recycled P,
i.e. =G t P t( ) ( ) ( )w w for its price = =p t p only( )G p www . If the trader
would sell a mixed fertilizer product= +G t P t P t( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )w w m m , its price would be lower
( <p t p only( )G w ) and allow to buy more fertilizer G t( ). Consequently,
the trader's supply curve would be above the budget constraint curve
pGcosts (Fig. 7–8).
In case the WWTP supply P maxw cannot meet the demand for re-
covered phosphorus P( )w w (Fig. 8) the trader would add mineral
fertilizer P t( )m to receive a mixed fertilizer product= +Gmix t P max t P t( ) ( ) ( ) ( )w m m . Hence, farmers spend all avail-
able budget pGcosts and pay the composite fertilizer price=p t p sold( )G G .
Depending on whether the price level of mineral fertilizer or re-
cycled phosphorus is cheaper, the supply curve of the trader will be
either upward sloping (Fig. 5) or downward sloping (Fig. 6) as we show
in Proposition 1. The demand curve of farmers is always downward
sloping in the price level of the composite fertilizer good p t( )G .
Proposition 1. The traders’ supply function changes its qualitative behavior
if the farmers are willing to pay more for the composite fertilizer than the
world market price for P (pm), e.g. Fig. 6.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.□
In other words, if farmers are willing to pay (WTP) more for the
composite fertilizer ( >p max( , )GWTP p pww mm ) traders will sell more of theexpensive product, i.e. recycled fertilizer Pw in Fig. 7.
3.1.2. Environmental quality
Household consumption decisions (c c,gc ac) influence P flows in water
bodies which can cause eutrophication. Since we assume that house-
holds care for environmental quality, the consumption decisions will be
influenced by their impact on the environment. These interesting
feedbacks within the coupled human-water system are described by the
Fig. 5. Shows the fertilizer market for the composite fertilizer G (x-axis) if the effective price level (y-axis) of the mineral fertilizer pm
m
is above the effective price level
of the recycled P product pw
w
. The ascending traders supply curve intersects the decreasing farmers’ demand function. The intersection WTPfarmer yields the market
equilibrium quantity GWTP equivalent to the plants fertilizer demand plant maxG below the maximum G-supply P maxw , and the corresponding market equilibrium
price saturates p [ , ]GWTP
pw
w
pm
m
.
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Fig. 6. Shows the fertilizer market for the composite fertilizer G if the effective price level of the mineral fertilizer pm
m
is below the effective price level of the recycled
P product pw
w
.
Fig. 7. The fertilizer market for the composite fertilizer G if only recycled P, Pw is used and farmers budget allows to overfertilize.
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dynamics of the environment (Eq. (18)) and by the optimal household
demand for grain cgc (Eq. (19)) and the analogous demand for the meat
consumption good cac Considering Eq. (20) and (21) (see Appendix A)
and the fact that pp
E
c
E
c
g
c
a
c ac gc
is negative yield the specific coupled
feedbacks described below.
= +c p
p c E c c
p
p
E
c
E
c
( )
( , )
[ ]gc D c
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c
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c
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c
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c
a
c
a
c
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Generally, more consumption decreases environmental quality. A
decrease in environmental quality would again increase consumption,
since individuals derive utility from consumption and environmental
quality and these are substitutes. A society acting like that would in the
long term deteriorate environment.
Otherwise, if e.g. environmental quality is really bad, the impact of
environment is the dominant decision driver, and an increase in en-
vironmental quality leads to less consumption and this in turn increases
environmental quality further. The utility would increase over time
until the environment has reached a maximum. Then the negative loop
would start again. The only exception is if the society prefers animal
products, i.e. c is significantly larger than c. In that case grain con-
sumption would actually increase if environmental quality increases.
3.2. Numerical results
In Austria P in sewage sludge is partly recycled via direct application
of sewage sludge on the agricultural fields additional to spreading animal
manure. The additional P demand is met by importing mineral fertilizer.
In the base case for our analysis we therefore allow the choice of a
combination of mineral fertilizer and direct application of sewage sludge.
The parameters are summarized in Tables E.3 and E.4 and the initial
values in Table E.2. Fig. 9 summarizes the P flows in our model frame-
work and displays the flow values for the first and nineth model period.
They represent the most important flows of P in an economy. Such a P
flow diagram helps to identify strategies to improve environmental
quality with respect to P, to choose a certain P recovery technology and to
monitor dynamics of P stock in soil and water bodies. Stocks of P in crop
production are P accumulation in soil, whereas stocks of P in animal
husbandry and in the P recovery process represent only the transfer of P
to the next period. The largest and therefore most important P flows are
the fertilizer applications via manure or bought fertilizer on the crop
fields. Households consume most P via vegetarian food. Fig. 10 presents a
base case simulation of the evolution of the most important P flows and
stocks of Fig. 9: P in soil together with the evolution of the mineral fer-
tilizer and recycled phosphorus. In addition we also record the maximum
P supply over time and the quantity of overfertilization, which is the
change of stock in “Crop production” for each period.
In the presented base case scenario, mineral fertilizer is cheap and
direct application of sewage sludge is even cheaper. Farmer's will-
ingness to pay for fertilizer is therefore above the actual market price
(cf. Fig. 7 and 8) and consequently they overfertilize (Fig. 10 years
1–7). So the P stock in soil increases. This was the case in Austria in the
1980s and 1990s.
A larger P stock implies that farmers do not have to acquire as much
additional fertilizer and can afford to spend more on employing labor
and hence wages increase since the demand for labor rises. Higher
wages in turn increase the income of households, who can then afford
more expensive food and buy more meat products. Agricultural farmers
Fig. 8. The fertilizer market for the composite fertilizer G in case of overfertilization. Farmers take the full potential of recycled P and add some mineral fertilizer to
buy the maximum amount of fertilizer =G t Gmix( ) for a resulting composite price =p t p sold( )G G considering their budget constraint p costsG .
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adapt and plant more fodder crops. So the supply of vegetarian products
decreases and its price increases stronger than the price of fodder
products. The fact that inflation for food was higher than for other
consumption goods in Austria in the past years fits to that picture.
The consumption behavior and employment structure resulting
from the model replicates the current situation in Austria. Households
eat slightly more vegetarian products than animal products. And more
people are employed in the grain sector (62%) than in animal hus-
bandry.
3.3. Price level increase of imported mineral fertilizer
In 2008 the price of imported mineral fertilizer increased from
2040EUR/tP to 3800EUR/tP. Such a price rise is introduced for the
years 7–15 (Fig. 10) to allow us to study how such a price increase in
our model will affect the fertilizer market and consequently all the
other markets. We can identify decreasing wages and increasing prices
of alternative fertilizer and consumption goods, decreasing mineral
fertilizer imports and a decreasing P stock.
As soon as the price of the mineral fertilizer rises, the grain farmer's
willingness to pay increases and equals the even higher market price of
P fertilizer. So farmers cannot afford overfertilization any longer
(Fig. 10 years 8–15) and apply less fertilizer. In the base case farmers
can choose between mineral fertilizer and direct application of sewage
sludge. The quality of sewage sludge, i.e. the P availability for the
plants, is too low to guarantee that the plant receives enough P to grow
to its full extent. Farmers are not willing to buy 100% of the available
recycled P (max P supply in Fig. 10) and have to also decrease the
amount of direct application of sewage sludge to spend the money ra-
ther on the more efficient mineral fertilizer (Fig. 10 years 8–11).
Applying less fertilizer lowers the P stock in soil over time.
Consequently, demand of P fertilizer increases to compensate P in soil.
Farmers cannot afford the increased demand of P fertilizer and under-
fertilize. This quantity effect is intensified by a price effect: Lower grain
prices decrease revenues and fertilizer costs increase. Sensitivity ana-
lysis has shown that even lowering the number of employees and their
wages cannot compensate these price changes.
Most important, farmers do not build up P stock after a fertilizer
price increase. The degradation of environmental quality is reduced.
The severe overall fertilizer price change affects all other prices. In
the short term, the fertilizer price increase in the grain production
sector increases production input costs. Consequently, fodder supply
decreases (Fig. 11(a)). Since fertilizer requires more monetary resources
for production, farmers can pay less for the complementary production
input labor. Wages decrease because less labor is demanded in the grain
sector. Consequently the second agricultural production sector, animal
husbandry, can spend more on its other production input, fodder, and
fodder demand increases in the short term (Fig. 11(b)).
In the long term workers move from the more labor intensive grain
sector to the animal husbandry sector. Still, 58% of agricultural labor
remain in the grain sector in the base case and, overall, wages decline.
Hence, lower income leads to reduced food demand. This results in two
Fig. 9. Sankey-style diagram (i.e. arrow widths are directly proportional to flow quantities) of P flows in period 1 (left) and period 9 (right) of the base case model.
Fig. 10. Fertilizer use over time given the option of direct
application of sewage sludge, i.e. recycled P fertilizer. The
price increase of mineral fertilizer in year 7 decreases the
use of P fertilizer in the short term and the level of mineral
fertilizer in the long term, and consequently lowers the P
stock in soil. Max P supply is the maximum available
amount of recycled P that the WWTP offers to the farmers
and overfertilization show if farmers apply more or less P
than the plants can absorb.
J. Grames, et al. Resources Policy 61 (2019) 311–347
320
opposite effects. Reduced household demand for high quality grain
products combined with the short term fodder price increase forces
agricultural farmers to shift to a crop variety that produces more lower
quality fodder products. Consequently fodder supply increases
(Fig. 11(c)) and supply for high quality grain products decrease.
Therefore prices for vegetarian products increase. This shifts the
household's demand to a more dairy or meat based diet. To serve the
resulting increased demand of animal products, fodder demand in-
creases (Fig. 11(b)). Contrary, overall reduced food demand also re-
duces animal husbandry's demand of the intermediate good fodder
(Fig. 11(d)).
The resulting fodder price pga dynamics of the first long term effect
characterize the final price change, but they are twofold: The increased
fodder demand leads to a fodder price increase (Fig. 11(b)), whereas the
increased fodder supply yields a fodder price decrease (Fig. 11(c)). In
the base case, where farmers use mineral fertilizer and direct
application of sewage sludge, the fodder price increases 3% (Fig. 12
(A1)). Whenever a P recovering technology is used to treat sewage
sludge, the second effect is dominant, because fertilizer efficiency is
higher and therefore it is easier to increase supply. In case of Ostara
Pearl Reactor® the fodder price decreases 5%, for applying the Stuttgart
process fodder price decreases 8% and for the most expensive tech-
nology EcoPhos® the price decreases even 13% (Fig. 12 (A4)). The
lower production input prices in the animal husbandry allow for lower
prices for animal products.
The increased share of fodder products in the grain farmer's product
portfolio leads to a lower average price per produced ton of grain, even
though the price for household's grain consumption goods increased. In
the end households pay higher prices with lower income.
If the price of recycled P is low, the effects of the price increase for
mineral fertilizer are much stronger. If e.g. recovered P from EcoPhos®
treatment can be sold for less than 2000EUR/tP, the reduction of
Fig. 11. Direct (a,b) and indirect (c,d) effects of mineral fertilizer price pm changes for fodder cga supply S and demand D.
Fig. 12. Long term effects on the fodder cga market after a mineral fertilizer price pm change.The fodder price pga increases given the possibility of direct application A1
or decreases by using P recycling with EcoPhos® technology A4.
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overfertilization due to increased prices for mineral fertilizer would
more than double.
3.4. Different P recycling technologies
Next, we study the market changes for the four different recovery
methods (A1-A4) introduced in Section 2.2.
Offering P recovery technologies (A2, A3, A4) keeps the P stock in
the soil significantly lower compared to no recycling or allowing only
direct application of sewage sludge (A1) additional to the application of
mineral fertilizer (Fig. 13).
However, for grain farmers efficient grain production is more im-
portant than environment. Given any P recycling method (A1-A4) and
stable fertilizer prices grain farmers overfertilize and the P stock in the
soil increases every year (Fig. 13, year 1–7). This reflects the current
situation in Austria.
Even after the fertilizer price increase in year 7, the combination of
direct application of sewage sludge (A1) and mineral fertilizer is cheap
enough to ensure plants will receive enough P fertilizer. As indicated in
Fig. 13, for year 8–15, overfertilization is close to zero, because enough
P fertilizer is applied, and plants absorb less P from the P stock in the
soil. This changes when we introduce P recovery technologies (A2, A3,
A4). After a price increase of mineral fertilizer the price of the fertilizer
composition increases sufficiently and therefore marginal costs of fer-
tilization become larger than the marginal revenue for applying as
much fertilizer as necessary for the plant to grow to its full potential. As
a result, farmers underfertilize slightly and force the plants to absorb P
from the soil. Consequently, environment recovers faster.
After the mineral fertilizer price increase the prices farmers have to
pay for different recycled P fertilizer products also change significantly.
If recycled P is already expensive the actual price change is not as
strong as for cheap recycled fertilizer, but still increases at least 50%.
However, Fig. 14 displays, that a price increase of imported mineral
fertilizer has only short term effects on the use of imported mineral
fertilizer if a P recovery technology (A2, A3, A4) is installed. A few
years after the price increase firms on the market adjust all other
quantities and prices to the higher price of the mineral fertilizer and
apply as much or even more mineral fertilizer as before the price in-
crease. Only in case of direct application of sewage sludge (A1) its high
P recovery potential and its low price allow a reduction of imported
mineral fertilizer.
Generally, the total level of applied fertilizer is decreasing more if,
additional to a more expensive mineral fertilizer, the recovered P fer-
tilizer product is more expensive. This leads to a stronger under-
fertilization (Fig. 14) and therefore a more significant reduction of P
stock in soil.
Implementing any P recovery technology (A2, A3, A4) and offering
the recycled product as P fertilizer would lead to reusing 100% of the
recovered P (Fig. 14) independent of the price level of mineral fertilizer.
Since P in treated recycled products is more easily available for the
plants, less overfertilization happens. An important observation is that
farmers would always optimally choose the maximum available amount
of recovered P. Nevertheless, this is not yet enough to meet the plant's P
demand and farmers have to add imported mineral fertilizer or exploit
the P stock in the soil.
Treated recycling products cause a higher fertilizer price. This af-
fects the grain production more than animal husbandry and we can
observe a slight increase in meat consumption. This fertilizer price ef-
fect due to a more costly recovering technology implies the same me-
chanisms as in the base case after the price shock. Generally, im-
plementing costly P recovery technologies does not significantly change
consumption levels compared to the base case with the possibility of
cheap direct application of sewage sludge, but prices change.
Households spend significantly more on food consumption if no P
recovering technology is implemented. However, quality has its price. If
we only compare the scenarios with implemented P recovering tech-
nologies, the most expensive recovering technology leads to the highest
prices for vegetarian products. Nevertheless, prices are still lower than
in the scenario (A1) with no P recovering technology.
Economies benefit from investing in P recycling. Better recovering
technologies, i.e. a greater recovering potential and better plant avail-
ability of the recycled material, enable farmers to buy less imported
mineral fertilizer. This is important for two reasons: First, the economy
depends less on the P world market and its prices. Second,
Fig. 13. P accumulation in soil and corresponding overfertilization (stock and stock changes in “crop production” in Fig. 2) over time, when grain farmers choose,
additional to mineral fertilizer, also fertilizer from different recycling technologies: Direct application of sewage sludge (A1), Ostara Pearl Reactor® (A2), Stuttgart
process (A3), EcoPhos® (A4). Note that negative overfertilization is underfertilization and forces the plant to take up P from the soil.
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environmental quality is higher since P recovered by a better tech-
nology includes less heavy metals and organic micropollutants, and less
P ends up in water bodies where P can cause eutrophication.
Any P recovery technology (A2, A3, A4) leads to better environ-
mental quality and profits of grain farmers are generally higher than in
the base case scenario. In any case, profits of grain farmers are higher
than profits for animal husbandry. However, there are also some eco-
nomic trade-offs. Wages and consumption levels decrease.
To sum up, the most important benefit of implementing a recovery
technology is the increase of environmental quality. Even though direct
application of sewage sludge has advantages for plant growth and
farmers profits, it yields the worst environmental quality in comparison
to recovering technologies A2-A4.
3.5. Environmental friendly society
A different mind set causes a different optimal choice of P re-
covering technologies. In the base case household utility decreases by
implementing a better and therefore more costly P recovering tech-
nology. This is why there are still no P-recycling technologies im-
plemented e.g. in Austria. If environmental quality plays a crucial role
in the societies objective, it is optimal to invest in better technologies
(i.e. EcoPhos®) and adjust consumption accordingly.
If people value environment, they also care about it. By slightly
adapting the consumption behavior, less fertilizer is needed to meet the
demand and consequently less P can run off into surrounding water
bodies.
A positive mind set towards environment even leads to higher wages
and higher profits in agriculture and animal husbandry. The reason is a
higher willingness to pay for food.
3.6. Sensitivity analysis
The choice of the parameter values describing the different recovery
technologies (Table E.5) is crucial for the model output. The main re-
sults of a sensitivity analysis for fertilizer efficiency A( )w and recovery
potential A( ) are discussed below, followed by an outline of model
limitations.
A better P availability A( )w in the recycling product for the plant
would obviously lead to a more efficient use of the recycled P product
and consequently less application of the product. Still, the qualitative
model outcome would only change for expensive P products. If we as-
sume a plant availability of 80% for recovered P from the expensive
EcoPhos process instead of 100%, 20% less recycled P from the WWTP
would be consumed. Still, P stock in the soil would increase since plants
absorb less.
For any other recovering technology reduction in A( )w would only
lead to an increasing use of mineral fertilizer, if imported mineral fer-
tilizer is expensive. The resulting increase of fertilizer prices yields that
the farmers are only willing to pay more for more efficient fertilizer, i.e.
mineral fertilizer. If e.g. P recovered with the Stuttgart process performs
with an efficiency of only 50% P plant availability instead of 85%,
farmers would not use any of the recycled P after a price increase for
mineral fertilizer. The same would apply to P recovered by the EcoPhos
process if efficiency decreases from 100% to 80%.
The recovery potential A( ) directly impacts the amount of avail-
able P after the recycling process. If more recycled P is available
farmers buy adequately less mineral fertilizer. If the plant availability of
recycled P is lower than of mineral fertilizer ( <w m), the P stock in
soil increases. This is the case for any recycling technology besides
EcoPhos, because it would be too expensive to overfertilize.
4. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we have developed a two sector general equilibrium
model and studied how households' consumption decisions and farmers'
profit maximization affect phosphorus (P) flows and resulting P stocks
in soil and water bodies. Different P recovery technologies treat waste
water and provide recycled P fertilizer products. Farmers can choose
recycled P products and alternatively imported P mineral fertilizer.
Environmental quality reflects contaminants in soil and P in water
bodies, and is best if P is recycled from waste water and then used as
fertilizer. This has even positive consequences on the economy. Profits
in crop production increase, wages are higher and food prices remain
stable.
A reduction of P stock in the soil can be achieved by implementing a
Fig. 14. Farmer's choice of optimal fertilizer composition given the four different P recovery technologies. Time series of mineral fertilizer and recycled P in Fig. 2
and the respective maximum amount of available P for the plant.
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recovering technology, whereas at the same time prices of imported
mineral fertilizer have to be high. However, Koppelaar and Weikard
(2013) points out that costs for recycling P from wastewater are above
any foreseeable phosphate rock fertilizer price. Cheap imported mineral
fertilizers provide no incentive to lower fertilizer application as argued
in Withers et al. (2014). If policy makers help to lower prices for re-
covering P or even to increase mineral P prices by taxes or tolls, a
technological change would occur with more effective P use and lower
P losses, resulting in better environmental quality.
Economically, a price increase of imported mineral fertilizer would
increase food prices and reduce household income for employees in
agriculture.
To avoid such economic impacts of world market fertilizer prices
the economy has to be independent. Thus, it is important to enhance
recycling to close the loop of P resource use. Childers et al. (2011);
Koppelaar and Weikard (2013); Zoboli et al. (2016b) also argue for a
similar strategy to secure P access for farmers. Our model does not
include additional strategies like reducing P loss from soils by erosion
abatement (Zoboli et al., 2016b), or prospect and explore new sources
of mineral P (Childers et al., 2011).
A more advanced recovery technology (i.e. recovering P from ashes)
allows a stronger decrease of P in soil and water bodies. Whenever
recycled P is offered, farmers use 100% of the available recovery pro-
ducts independent of the price of mineral fertilizer. To cover the total
fertilizer demand there is a need, first, to increase the collection of
sewage sludge and waste products containing P and, second, to increase
the recovery potential of P recovery technologies.
These conclusions are based on the modeling choices: Besides direct
application of sewage sludge, only recovery technologies that ensure
the production of fertilizers with relatively high plant availability and
low levels of contaminants are taken into account. This explains their
superior performance in comparison to direct application of sewage
sludge and also the positive feedbacks they trigger both in the economy
and in the environment. If technological options offering products with
a poorer quality (Egle et al., 2016) were included in the model, the
outcomes would likely be very different.
Without any incentives to change the current consumption and
fertilization behavior, overfertilization and high P stocks in soil remain
a threat for the environment. Furthermore, food prices would further
increase as this is the current case in Austria (Wien-Statistik, 2010).
A different mindset can crucially change economic decisions and
consequently the environment. A green society - i.e. having higher
preferences for environmental quality - would choose to implement the
most advanced and expensive P recovery technology. This would not
only improve environmental quality, but also increase households'
utility, wages and profits. Withers et al. (2014) also relates greater
public awareness of the environmental consequences to significant
economic, environmental, and resource-protection gains. To sum up,
agents with a green mindset are willing to pay higher food prices and
consequently higher production input costs to ensure high environ-
mental quality. Similar results are found in e.g. Hughner et al. (2007).
An important outcome of this work is the combination of an eco-
nomic general equilibrium model with material flow analysis. This
helps experts in resource management as well as economists to relate
their work to a broader context. We propose a first framework to en-
dogenously describe and explain material flows depending on economic
decisions. Through our approach we can understand how economic
decisions influence the environment based on mapping pollutant flows
in a particular case and vice versa. These insights can be applied to any
developed region or country, not only to Austria.
5. Model shortcomings and directions for further research
Like any conceptual model it cannot perfectly reflect reality. It has
not been econometrically estimated and, therefore, it does not serve as
a forecasting model. However, considering plausible assumptions the
results will shed light on what might actually happen if conditions re-
sembling the scenario settings occur. Generally, the interdisciplinary
modeling approach includes limitations from a perspective of every
single discipline. Bouman et al. (2000) also mentions challenges of
combining MFA modeling techniques and a partial equilibrium model.
In this paper the nonlinear production functions slightly loosen the
animal physiological and biological relationships of fodder and re-
spective meat products. On the other side, linear production functions,
as typically applied in material flow models by using transfer coeffi-
cients, would not be coherent with standard economic literature where
labor plays a crucial role as factor input.
The standard economic assumption of well informed and rational
farmers would lead to no overfertilization, hence, abandon the core of
this study. So, we introduced the concept of a trader, serving as inter-
mediary and regulatory agency. Aiming for appropriate fertilizer
quantity and the zero-profit-condition distinguishes the modeled trader
from a commercial fertilizer seller, who would only aim to maximize
profits. Finding an alternative model approach to capture the phe-
nomenon of overfertilization can be interesting for future research.
Further future work can include a more detailed modeling of the
agricultural sector by including different crop applications like biofuel,
more cost types or economic regulators. Some specific regulation po-
licies can be consumption tax or direct investments into environment.
Moreover, capturing the feedbacks of households' decisions and the
environment over many periods by aggregating the utility and deriving
optimal long term strategies is interesting work for future research.
Last, but not least, bioslurry uses, biogas nutrients, nutrient supply
through recycling food waste, human health effects of environmental
pollution and transportation aspects (Kok et al., 2018) could be ad-
ditionally considered in further modeling analysis.
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Appendix A. Market equilibrium
A.1. Demand and supply functions
We derive the demand and supply function of the households and the firms to obtain the market equilibria.
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Expressing µh from Eq. (A.3) and inserting in Eq. (A.4) yields an implicite function for the grain demand
= +c p
p c E c c
E c c[
( , )
( , )]gc c
g
c
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c
c
g
c
g
c
g
a g
c
g
a ( 1)
(A.7)
and we can reformulate the budget constraint to obtain the animal product demand as function of the grain demand
= + + + + + +c wL p P p c p x
p
( ) .ac D
g a w x m m g
c
g
c
x
g
c (A.8)
Using =c c L( ) ( )ga ac c a a1 1 1aca a inserting Eq. (A.8) in Eq. (A.7) we obtain an implicite function for c( )gc D that only depends on prices and La, whichwill be a result of the labor market equilibrium.
The supply for labor is=L 1000000.S (A.9)
Grain farmers. demand labor and fertilizers and maximize= + +G L µ p t P P G L p G wL( , , ) ( ) [ ] [ ] .g g g g g a a n n L g G gg g (A.10)
Note, that Pa and Pn are taken from the previous period t 1. From the first order conditions
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we can derive the demands for fertilizer and labor.
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Note, the fertilizer price is constraint with the world market price pm and the price for recycled P pw (proof see Appendix C.1).
The crop supplies (limited with the crop intake of P to P¯) are
= +c t p t
p t w t
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(A.15)
J. Grames, et al. Resources Policy 61 (2019) 311–347
325
=c t c t( ) ( ) ( )gc S gc gS (A.16)
=c t c t( ) ( ) ( )ga S ga gS (A.17)
The average price for grain is = +p t p t p t( ) ( ) ( )g gc gc ga ga .
Animal husbandry. maximizes by choosing the amount of fodder and labor.=c L p c L p c wL( , ) ( ) [ ]a ga a ac a ga L a ga ga aa a (A.18)
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the optimal demands and supply are
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Trader. The zero-profit condition is the budget constraint of the trader.= + =p G p A P p P( ¯ ) ( ) 0G G w w m m (A.24)
The production function is the combination of the fertilizer types.+ = +G A P P¯ ( ( ) ) ( )w w m m (A.25)
For no overfertilization = 0 the quantity constraint for an ideal fertilizer supply P¯ of the plant is fulfilled.= =G t G P p t P t( ) ¯ ¯ ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1)a ac n n (A.26)
Furthermore the trader is constraint to a maximum supply from the WWTP.
P Pw wmaxsupply (A.27)
In case budget, quantity and WWTP constraint can be fulfilled we derive the following demand for fertilizer on the world markets (see also
Fig. 4).
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D G w w
D
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A.2. Market clearing
We obtain the prices pgc, pga, pac, w, pG from the competitive markets for cgc, cga, cac, L, G, respectively. The open markets for Pm and Pw face infinitely
elastic supply and exogenous prices pm and pw, respectively.
The market clearing conditions are as follows.
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Note, c( )ac D cannot be explicitly expressed with prices and is still a function of c( )gc D. So we cannot derive the prices explicitly.
A.3. Tatonnement algorithm
We eliminate some equations and apply a tatonnement algorithm for the cgc and cac markets for every period. The full Matlab code can be found in
Appendix D, the outline is found in the following.
1. p t( )m , p A( )w , L given; E t( ), P t( )n , P t( 1)h from previous period
2. identify cheaper and more efficient fertilizer by testing p
p
m m
w w
smaller or larger than one, derive =G G¯ from plan constraint (A.26)
3. initialize pgc, pga, pa, pG
4. from L market derive w using G from plant constraint (A.26) in the first iteration of the algorithm
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5. from fertilizer G market derive pGWTP using farmers demand and the plant constraint (A.26)
= +p p p
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g L g g g
c
g
c
g
a
g
a1
1
1
1
g g g
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(A.36)
6. derive Pm and Pw, pGsold and Gsold
(a) check if pGWTP in [ ,
p pm
m
w
w
] without loss of generality or if we have to use a corner solution
(b) buy only =P p G p¯/m GWTP m if farmer's willingness to pay (WTP) is below the market prices for fertilizers and Pm is more efficient than Pw
(c) buy only =P p G p¯/w GWTP w or mixed if >P Pw wmaxsupply if farmer's WTP is outside the fertilizer price interval
(d) if the WTP is within the market fertilizer price range choose fertilizer according to Eq. (A.28) and (A.29), except >P Pw wmaxsupply
(e) derive overfertilization = G G¯ and the new P stock in the soil = + + +P P P P P P(1 )( ) ¯n m w ag n
(f) derive the P in plants = + +P G G P Pmin( , ¯ ) ( ) ( )g a a n n
7. derive pga from cga market using = + +ga 1( )(1 ) (1 )(1 )g g a a a g g
= +p pw w
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J. Grames, et al. Resources Policy 61 (2019) 311–347
327
8. prepare tatonnement
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= +p p c p G wL( )g gc gc ga ga gc S G gD (A.42)
= p c p c wL( ) ( )a a ac S g ga D aD (A.43)
= p Pw w w (A.44)
= +P cc c Pgc gcgc ga g g (A.45)
= +P cc c Pga gagc ga g g (A.46)
= + +P c c Pc ch gc ac ga g ggc ga (A.47)
=P A P( )w h (A.48)
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+ =E t E P P( 1) g w (A.50)
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9. tatonnement with dumping factor d:=p p d c c(( ) ( ) )a aold ac D ac S (A.53)
=p p d c c( ) ( )gc gc old gc D gc S (A.54)
10. repeat from step 4 and stop if + <c c c c tol|(( ) ( ) )| |(( ) ( ) )|ac D ac S gc D gc S
Appendix B. Overfertilization
The fertilizer market is one of the core elements of the proposed model framework. Farmers demand the composite fertilizer good G for a market
price pG (Eq. (A.13)). A trader combines mineral fertilizer Pm and recycled phosphorus Pw to the fertilizer composition G (Eq. (16)) and sells it for the
resulting price pG (Eq. (17)) under his zero-profit-condition and the price level constraints (see Appendix C.1). We can picture the traders fertilizer
supply (Eq. (C.1)), the farmers fertilizer demand, the plant demand G¯ and the maximum WWTP supply Pwmaxsupply in one graph (e.g. Fig. B.15). If the
quantity demand G t( ) from the farmers (Eq. (A.13)) cannot be met with the farmers willingness to pay for fertilizer p t( )G the trader sells+ = +G t t P t P t( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )w w m m . All cases for under- and overfertilization t( ) are explained below.
Farmers are willing to pay more than the necessary fertilizer price and the demand of recycled P can be met. The trader sells only recycled Pw and
considers the budget constraint. The sold amount G is displayed in Fig. B.15 and the price pG is exactly the price pw for Pw w.
Farmers fertilizer demand exceeds the amount of available recycled P fertilizer. Even if the trader sells all the available Pw for the price =pG pww farmersare still willing to pay more for fertilizer. So the trader also adds imported mineral fertilizer to the composite fertilizerGmix (Fig. B.16). Consequently,
the price for amount = +G G¯ changes to <pG pww (Eq. (17)).After a price shock of mineral fertilizer price relations change to >p pm w. If farmers WTP is above pw traders compose the fertilizer mix G analogous
to the cases in the previous paragraphs: The trader would only add Pm if the demand for Pw exceeds Pwmaxsupply. Contrary to the above case the new
price pG would then increase ( >p pG w).
Farmers are willing to pay less than the cheapest available fertilizer. If < <pGWTP p pmm ww or < <pGWTP p pww mm , the trader sells as much of the cheapest
Fig. B.15. Even if farmers pay the highest possible price =pG pww the are willing to buy more fertilizer G than the plants actually demand (plant maxG ) and
overfertilize.
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fertilizer as the budget constraint (Eq. (17)) allows. The fertilizer supply is less than the plants demand ( =G G¯ ) and we are in a case of
underfertilization.
Appendix C. Proofs for the fertilizer market
C.1. Proof: price pG is constraint
The price p t( )G of the composite fertilizer good G t( ) has to be in the interval [ , ]
p t p t( ) ( )m
m
w
w
if <p t p t( ) ( )m
m
w
w
w.l.o.g.
Proof:We can rewrite the production function (Eq. (16)) and budget constraint (Eq. (17)) of the trader into = ++p .G p P p PP Pm m w wm m w w . Note, = +G G¯ incase of overfertilization.
First, assume >pG pww . Then >++pw P PP P p
pm
pw
m w
m m w w
w
w
. We can rewrite that into >p t p t( ) ( )m
m
w
w
, which disproves the assumption and we conclude <pG pww .
Second, assume <pG pmm . Then <+ +pm P PP P pm
pw
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w
m m w w
m
m
. We can rewrite that again into <p t p t( ) ( )w
w
m
m
, which disproves the assumption and we conclude<pG pww .
Consequently, p [ , ]G p t p t( ) ( )mm
w
w
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. Analogous we can show p [ , ]G p t p t( ) ( )ww
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w
.
C.2. Proof: trader supply switches at a price level p t( )m
m
The traders supply function switches from downward (Fig. 5) to upward (Fig. 6) sloping at point =pG p t( )mm .Proof: From the production function (Eq. (16)) and budget constraint (Eq. (17)) we can derive the traders supply curve
= +p G t P t p t
G t
G t P
p A P t( ( ); ( ))
( )
( )
[
( )
( ) ( )].G w
m w w
m
w w (C.1)
The partial derivative with respect to G is
=p
G
p t
G t
P
p A P t
( )
( )
[ ( ) ( )].G m w w
m
w w2 (C.2)
Fig. B.16. The willingness to pay for farmers G p( , )WTP GWTP allows to sell the fertilizer mix G p( , )sold Gsold .
J. Grames, et al. Resources Policy 61 (2019) 311–347
330
So we can express
=p G t P t p t
t
p t
G t
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( )
[ ( ) ( )]G w
m
m
m w w
m
w w (C.3)
= p t
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p
G
( )
( )
( ) .m
m
G
(C.4)
If >pG p t( )mm , then >G t( )p tt pG p t( )( ) ( )mm G mm and consequently < 0pGG . So the trader supply is downward sloping.
Analogous, if <pG p t( )mm , we can derive > 0pGG meaning the trader supply is upward sloping.
In the special case =pG p t( )mm the price of the fertilizer is constant, because only Pm is sold as G t( ).
Appendix D. Matlab code
The following is the main Matlab-file run_Pmodel.
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The following is the Matlab-file objectivesimple for the respective function.
The following is the Matlab-file objectiveExt1 for the respective function.
The following is the Matlab-file objectiveExt2 for the respective function.
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The following is the Matlab-file fertilizer for the respective function.
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The following is the Matlab-file Pflows for the respective function.
The following is the Matlab-file marketEQfinal for the respective function.
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The following is the Matlab-file marketEQEnv for the respective function.
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Appendix E. Variables and parameters
The agents in the model (agricultural farmers, animal husbandry, households) will optimally choose every year what we call decision variable.
Based on that decisions we obtain endogenous variables. Parameters and initial values are chosen according to existing literature or calibrated. For the
calibration we use data describing the decision variables and endogenous variables based on Austrian data (scaled to 1.000.000 inhabitants to be
nourished) from the years around 2010 stated in Wien-Statistik (2010) and Zoboli et al. (2016a). Most parameters could be derived explicitly from
the first order conditions described in Appendix A, the rest has been derived with a calibration algorithm, i.e. minimum mean square error, to reflect
the data.
An overview of variables and parameters is given in Tables E.1 and E.2, and Tables E.3, E.4 and E.5, respectively.
Table E.1
Decision variables of the model.
Symbol Description Unit
c t( )g total production of grain [t/a/cap]
c t( )gc household consumption of grain [t/a/cap]
c t( )ga fodder consumption [t/a/cap]
c t( )ac consumption of animal products [t/a/cap]
G t( ) fertilizer mix [t/a/cap]
L t( )g labor in grain production cap
L t( )a labor in animal husbandry cap
P t( )w recycled phosphorus-fertilizer from the waste water
treatment plant
[t/a/cap]
P t( )m mineral fertilizer [t/a/cap]
Table E.2
Endogenous variables of the model.
Symbol Description Unit Initial value Source
E t( ) quality of environment (amount of phosphorus in the water bodies) [] 100,000
x t( ) other goods [t/a/cap]
p t( )g price for grain EUR/t
p t( )g
c price for grain household products EUR/t
p t( )g
a price for grain fodder EUR/t
p t( )a price for animal products EUR/t
p t( )G price for fertilizer mix EUR/t
p t( )x price for other goods EUR/t
w t( ) wages EUR/cap
t( )g profit in grain production EUR/a
t( )a profit in animal husbandry EUR/a
t( )G profit of trader EUR/a
t( )w profit of WWTP EUR/a
t( )x profit in other sectors EUR/a
u t( ) household utility []
P t( )n “natural” phosphorus stock in the soil [t/a/cap] 0 Zoboli et al. (2016a)
P t( )gc phosphorus in the consumed grain products [t/a/cap]
P t( )ga phosphorus in the grain fodder for the animals [t/a/cap]
P t( )g losses of phosphorus (runoff from the grain field) [t/a/cap]
P t( )ag phosphorus in the animal manure applied to grain fields [t/a/cap] 2100 Zoboli et al. (2016a)
P t( )ac phosphorus in the consumed animal products [t/a/cap]
P t( )h phosphorus within the waste water from the households [t/a/cap] 600 Zoboli et al. (2016a)
P t( )w losses of phosphorus from the WWTP [t/a/cap]
P t( )w losses of phosphorus from the WWTP [t/a/cap]
P t( )wmaxsupply maximum supply of P from WWTP [t/a/cap]
amount of overfertilization [t/a/cap]
g
c grain yield fraction for household products [] 0.75 Wien-Statistik (2010)
g
a grain yield fraction for fodder products [] 0.25 Wien-Statistik (2010)
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j phosphorus source w m a n{ , , , }g
a plant availability of phosphorus from manure [0,1] 0.8 Zoboli et al. (2016a)
n plant availability of phosphorus from the natural stock in the soil [0,1] 0.4 Zoboli et al. (2016a)
A( )w plant availability of recycled phosphorus (see Table E.5) [0,1] [0.6, 0.85, 0.85, 1] Egle et al. (2014)
m plant availability of mineral fertilizer [0,1] 1 Egle et al. (2014)
tons of animal product from one ton grain (inverse FCR) 0.25 Zoboli et al. (2016a)
a
g P in the manure of animals as proportion of P in fodder [0,1] 0.75 Zoboli et al. (2016a)
a
c P in the animal products as proportion of P in fodder [0,1] 0.15 Zoboli et al. (2016a)
hg P in the households waste water as proportion of P in consumed grain [0,1] 0.7 Zoboli et al. (2016a)
ha P in the households waste water as proportion P in consumed animal products [0,1] 0.7 Zoboli et al. (2016a)
proportion of phosphorus run off from the field [0,1] 0.005 Zoboli et al. (2016a)
regeneration rate of the environment >1 1.001
wg loss fraction of grain food waste [0,1] 0.1 Zoboli et al. (2016a)
wa loss fraction of animal food waste [0,1] 0.1 Zoboli et al. (2016a)
w P run-off from waste water into water bodies [0,1] 0.1 Zoboli et al. (2016a)
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